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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
.1 ssue 1 , 
WHILE RULE OF PRACTICE 3.6(c) HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED, THE 
PROCEDURE FOR TAKING GUILTY PLEAS ENUNCIATED IN STATE v GIBBONS 
WAS BASED ON RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH REMAINS 
INTACT. THE REQUEST FOR REMAND IS CONSONANT WITH THIS COURT'S 
POLICY OF ALLOWING TRIAL JUDGES TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS 
AN ALLEGED ERROR. 
Plaintiff correctJ \u ;^ e * •ractice -
District and Circuit Courts, were supersede/ LO 
l)e t enfant, ' u I'har. ; 3 \ *-.* however ; *s procedure mandated ; n 
State v Gibbons, **.»•• Hu.^ r>t ractice 
3.6(c) but rather r Rule ll(e i :,. U* a; 
Procedi ^ ive remained intact rind identicai r language to 
the format they were i n at, i ho time of the Gibbons directive as 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec . 7 7 - 3 5 - I.1 , Gibbons was and r eitid i n; "
 :l 
stat.-j^ -;.i. •-. onceming the taking of guilty pleas in alL 
trial courti .: --.N .-..st-P, . . . " (at !Ui?) "If the court does 
not use affidavit, t * .»> requirements set tort h above ,m<i in 
Sec ' 1--- -..-•• - D e followed and be on t.he record " 
f/'Yise No 900268 
Pi ior i. t v 2 
The Plaintiff complains that the Defendant has failed to cite 
to the record in support of his allegation that the trial court 
failed to determine a factual basis for the entry of his guilty 
plea. The Defendant, in his Statement of the Case, has cited to 
the record a discussion that an affidavit was prepared but then 
not used. [Plea Trans. 2:12-19]. The required statement of facts 
is not contained at that location, nor at any other location in 
pages 1-29 of the Plea Transcript. To provide a more exact 
location for something that does not exist is quite difficult. It 
may be presumed that if the Plaintiff could have located any such 
Statement or Synopsis, she would have pointed it out. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that to remand the case due to the 
invalid procedure would somehow exceed this court's authority. 
This court did so in Gibbons "...consonant with the policy of 
allowing trial judges to have the opportunity to address an alleged 
error."(at 1312). This court should exercise its inherent 
supervisory power in the same way in this case to correct an 
obvious violation of its mandated procedure for acceptance of 
guilty pleas. 
Issue II. 
THE DEFENDANT HAS CITED TO THE RECORD BUT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO 
SUPPLEMENT THAT RECORD OR HAVE THE MATTER REMANDED FOR A HEARING 
IN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY. 
Despite this court having denied Defendant's Motion To 
Supplement The Record with his affidavit, his letter to Judge Low 
dated January 1, 1990 [Exhibit H, Brief of Appellant] is among 
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those documents in the record that has been cited by the Defendant 
in his Statement Of The Case. In that letter, he requests the 
court to change his attorney. His first attorney "has been too 
busy to give this case any priority at all. He has given me wrong 
advice, withheld critical information from me...." While the 
Defendant would have the ability to provide a more extensive record 
if he was left to post-conviction relief after this appeal, it 
would be in the interest of judicial economy for this court to 
reconsider its denial of Defendant's Motion To Supplement The 
Record to give flesh to his complaints in his letter of January 1, 
1990 and/or permit the defendant to make such a record in the 
District Court on this issue in connection with a remand as to 
Issue I. 
Issue III.A. 
ANY FAIR READING OF THE TRIAL COURT'S COMMENTS REQUIRES THE 
CONCLUSION THAT IT HAD DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT A 
STEPFATHER IN A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE WAS PRECLUDED FROM 
CONSIDERATION FOR PROBATION UNDER UTAH CODE 76-5-406.5. 
It is clear from Mary Ann's letter to Judge Low dated September 
18, 1989, that she regarded the Defendant as her 
husband and the stepfather of her daughter, the alleged victim. 
However, due to the trial court's ruling as a matter of law, the 
factual basis for the common law marriage was not explored or 
determined. Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, the State 
appears to concede the fact that a common law marriage exists. 
The state did not argue that a common law marriage did not exist 
but only that the legislature would have had to specify a common 
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law step-parent if it had meant to include such. 
If they intended for anybody who has been—if they 
intended, for an example, a common law situation, they 
could have called for that. I submit that the language 
here suggests a natural parent, a biological parent or 
a step-parent by a legal guardian by legal proceedings 
and not the contrary. 
[Sent.Trans.34:12-18] 
Although the trial court made no finding nor entered any order 
regarding the validity of the common law marriage, there would have 
been ample support for the finding. Page 8 of the Presentence 
Report, included in the record, indicates that he and Maryanne 
started living together on June 24, 1982, that this relationship 
remains intact, and the next page examines in detail the sexual 
history of this relationship. Page 4 of the attached psychological 
evaluation specifically refers to this relationship as the 
Defendant's third marriage. The Presentence Report itself, though 
once referring to the alleged victim as Jennifer Berthal [p.2], and 
her mother as Mary Anne Berthal Johnson [p.8], usually refers to 
the girl and her mother by the last name of Johnson, [p.8,11,13]. 
But for the implied stipulation of the parties that a common-law 
marriage existed, and the erroneous ruling that such were 
statutorily precluded from consideration, there is a substantial 
likelihood that all the elements of a common-law marriage would 
have been established. 
Issue III.B. 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF SEVERE PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM, 
THAT THERE WAS NONE, WAS UNREBUTTED. 
4 
Plaintiff complains that there is no cite to the record in 
support of Defendant's allegation that there was no severe 
psychological harm. Defendant has amply cited letters to the judge 
from the alleged victim and her mother, part of the record, in his 
Statement Of The Case. [p.7]. That evidence was unrebutted. 
Defendant's point was and remains that the trial court not only 
abused its discretion but also committed an error of law by 
creating an unrebuttable presumption, "that this kind of abuse 
cannot but substantially harm psychologically and emotionally the 
victim." [Sent.Trans.46:7-10]. 
Issue III.C. 
IN ADDITION TO EXERCISING ITS INHERENT POWER TO REQUIRE MORE 
FROM THE STATE THAN AN UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION OF ABUSE OF 
ANOTHER VICTIM, THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT SUSTAIN HIS 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Plaintiff agrees that this court has inherent supervisory power 
over judicial processes to ensure that the judicial processes are 
not abused, to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial 
branch, and most important, seeing that justice is done. The 
evidence presented by the state, vague and contradictory statements 
by a 3 1/2 year old girl after being apprised by her mother of 
"Uncle Mill's problem", made during a period of her own parents' 
separation, and thoroughly rebutted by the Defendant's wife and 
their daughter, was so speculative that to place the burden upon 
the Defendant to disprove it was unfair and unjust. In addition, 
the contradictions of the statements, as to whether her parents 
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were present, whether the single alleged touching was over or under 
her clothes, whether her brother was present, and whether it 
occurred in her old or new home, were so inherently untrustworthy 
that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the 
Defendant had not sustained his burden of proof. 
Issue III.D. 
DEFENDANT HAS AMPLY CITED TO THE RECORD IN HIS STATEMENT OF 
THE CASE. THE COURT HAS NOT ONLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BUT HAS 
ERRED IN SETTING A STANDARD WHICH FEW IF ANY DEFENDANTS COULD 
SATISFY. 
Defendant has cited to the record in his Statement Of The Case 
both as to the nature, frequency,and duration of the conduct on 
page 6 and the issue of acceptance into a treatment program on page 
10. The court abused its discretion by not accepting the: 
daughter's recantation of her initial statements to the police anc: 
her explanation for the same. If the judge accepted the daughter's; 
corrected statement, in her letter to the judge, that such conduct 
had occurred eight times in three years but still refused tc: 
consider probation, this would present a standard which few if any 
family abusers could ever meet to qualify for probation. The; 
standard set by the trial court in this case goes beyond what could 
have been contemplated by the legislature. 
Issue IV. 
EVEN THOUGH THIS COURT HAS DECLINED TO PERMIT THE DEFENDANT TO 
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD AS TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
DEFENDANT HAS SET FORTH AMPLE BASIS IN THE RECORD TO DEMONSTRAT 2 
THAT HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
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This court has denied the Defendant's motion to supplement the 
record with his affidavit which was submitted as exhibit A and to 
which was attached a letter containing some very specific 
instructions to his attorney, few if any of which were done prior 
to or at the time of sentencing. This court has also declined 
Defendant's motion to obtain and provide to this court evidence 
from his trial attorney's disciplinary proceedings later that year 
showing substantial medical problems that were interfering with his 
ability to render competent legal assistance. Nevertheless, the 
record is still sufficient to show the ineffectiveness of counsel. 
In his letter to the trial judge postmarked April 7, 1990, and 
among the documents that are in the record in this case, [Exhibit 
I, Brief of Appellant], the Defendant states: 
Judge Low, I am Mills Johnson. I am writing you out of 
fear for the well being of my family as well as my own 
future. The delay of my sentencing has been a tremendous 
strain on my wife and daughter. If it had been necessary 
at all it would have been at least easier to tolerate. 
This case should have been over no later than November. 
When I was told that I had to waive my right to the 30 
day limit, I had no idea I was sentencing myself at the 
same time. Your honor, I know you have heard many 
excuses explaining why this case is still pending, but 
there is only one reason that holds water. The steps 
necessary to gather the evidence for the hearing you 
requested simply have not been taken. This case has been 
set aside and all but forgotten. I even wrote a 
checklist of the things we needed to do for the new 
Public Defender and to date I know of none that are done. 
Today marks day #252 that I have been incarcerated. . . 
The omissions revealed by the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing are manifest. Despite having the burden of proof, 
Defendant's attorney did not present any testimony or affidavits 
of either the Defendant or his wife or his daughter but instead 
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relied entirely on the letters that the wife and daughter had 
written to the judge. This omission fell below the objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that the trial judge, despite the letters of both the 
wife and the daughter, found that the defendant had not sustained 
his burden of proof. 
As to the issue of common law marriage, counsel, despite the 
implied stipulation of the parties, should have explicitly provided 
to the court through testimony or affidavits all of the factual 
basis for its existence and requested from the court a ruling 
thereon. There cannot be any strategic basis for this omission. 
As to the issue of severe psychological harm to the victim, no 
request was made to the court for funds or an order for the 
psychological testing of the defendant. If the trial court was 
correct in creating a virtually irrebuttable presumption of severe 
psychological harm that could be overcome only by expert testimony, 
counsel's failure to secure that evaluation or to ask for a 
continuance to secure that evaluation can have no strategic basis. 
As to the allegation of a second victim, there is no indication 
in the record that counsel ever attempted to secure a court order 
for an independent evaluation of the 3 year old girl. Given the 
substantial penalty at stake, there can be no strategic basis for 
this omission. Nor can there be a strategic basis for counsel's 
failure to provide testimony or affidavits of the Defendant, his 
wife, or his daughter as to the information that the wife and 
daughter provided in their letters. 
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As to the nature, frequency, and duration of the conduct and 
defendant's acceptance into a treatment center, no reason is 
revealed in the record for counsel's failure to arrange for the 
testimony of Defendant's wife and daughter rather than relying 
solely on their letters. At a minimum, either affidavits could 
have been obtained or a conference call with the trial judge could 
have been requested and arranged. It does not appear that there 
can be a strategic basis for this failure. Indeed as is 
demonstrated by Defendant's April 7 letter to the judge, there was 
simply a failure to provide effective assistance of counsel. 
That counsel's performance prejudiced the Defendant is also 
clear. Qualification for probation and the avoidance of the 
minimum mandatory sentence is dependant on counsel's obligation to 
present to the court sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's 
burden of proof. 
While the Defendant is well aware of his right to petition for 
post-conviction relief once he has exhausted this appeal, the 
failures and omissions that are presently evident from the current 
record are so substantial that this court can and should find that 
the Defendant was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand to permit the Defendant to withdraw 
his guilty pleas, or in the alternative, remand for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
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Respectfully submitted this 30th dciy of September, 1991. 
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee, R. 
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, and Judith S. H. Atherton, 
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, UT 
84114, on the 30 day of September, 1991. 
Nathan Hult 
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